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The way to get after these people [terrorists] is to get after
them with both barrels.
-Secretary of State George P. Shultz 1
INTRODUCTION
Secretary of State Shultz expresses the frustration and anger felt
by many in the wake of terrorist attacks.2 Americans abroad are
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Harvard.
I. Boston Globe, Nov. 25, 1985, at 7, col. 4.
2. The term "terrorism" is inherently value-laden. See Falk, The Beirut Raid and the
International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415 (1969); and Levenfeld, Israel's
Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern Interna-
tional Law, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1982). Falk chose to "balance" the terms he used;
Levenfeld chose to use the "neutral" term "Fedayeen."
The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another's "freedom fighter" may be apropos in the
Israel-Lebanon battle arena, the subject of the Falk and Levenfeld article. This Article, in
contrast, concentrates on terrorist attacks in general, undertaken by a variety of organiza-
tions for a variety of purposes, and argues that certain acts cannot be justified regardless of
the cause espoused. "Terrorism" is the most recognizable term to apply to such attacks.
"Indeed, for most terrorist acts, the acts themselves-aside from questions of political moti-
vation-are precisely those crimes (for example, homicide and kidnapping) which are univer-
sally recognized as morally and legally unacceptable." Comment, Controlling International
Terrorism: An Analysis of Unilateral Force and Proposals for Multilateral Cooperation, 8
U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 242 (1976).
A comprehensive definition of "terrorism" is beyond the scope of this Article. An Ad Hoc
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the number one target for terrorists and the frustration grows as
the attacks continue.' Pressure builds for the United States to fight
back and on April 14, 1986, the United States did just that with an
air strike against targets in Libya."
Secretary of State Shultz has been a strong advocate for military
action. "Passive defense" is to give way to "active defense:"
From a practical standpoint, a purely passive defense does not
provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the States that
sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard, and seriously about more
active means of defense-about defense through appropriate pre-
ventive or preemptive actions against terrorist groups before they
strike. 5
Yet, anger must be tempered by reason. The strategic, political and
legal wisdom of an "active defense" must be weighed carefully.
This Article will assess the legality of state-sponsored military re-
sponses to terrorism: Does a state have a right under international
law to use extraterritorial force to combat terrorist attacks?
The legality of an "active defense" will be examined against the
international norms represented in the Charter of the United Na-
tions. Moreover, since the United Nations provides the forum for
international debate on the propriety of any military response,
United Nations' practice will be examined in detail.' General As-
sembly resolutions and Security Council decisions will be reviewed
Committee on International Terrorism established by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1972, and periodically renewed, has been unable to fashion a definition satisfactory to its
35 members. See G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII) (1972); G.A. Res. 31/102 (1976); G.A. Res. 32/
174 (1977); G.A. Res. 34/145 (1979); G.A. Res. 36/109 (1981); G.A. Res. 38/130 (1983);
and G.A. Res. 40/61 (1985).
However, a lack of a definition of "terrorism" has not prevented the adoption of measures
to deal with the problem. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977,
Europ. T.S. No. 97, without defining terrorism, lists offenses which for the purposes of extra-
dition are not regarded as political in nature. And the Security Council of the United Na-
tions saw fit to condemn terrorism "in all its form, wherever and by whomsoever committed"
without further explanation. 40 U.N. SCOR S/PV 2618 (1985). So, too, this Article will
address the subject of "terrorism" without the benefit of a detailed definition.
3. Oakley, Terrorism: Overview and Developments, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1985, at
61. Robert Oakley is director of the Office for Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning.
In his overview, a 20% increase was noted in terrorist incidents in 1984 with 600 terrorist
incidents recorded.
4. A recent example of a compendium of writings urging a forceful U.S. response is
FIGHTING BACK (N. Livingstone and T. Arnold eds. 1986). A summary of the U.S. air
strike against Libya is found in TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 16-33; NEWSWEEK. Apr. 28, 1986,
at 16-31.
5. Shultz, Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug.
1984, at 31, 33.
6. Practice of the United Nations is regarded as a valuable source of information,
especially given the universality of its membership. See Higgins, The Legal Limits to the
Use of Force by Sovereign States United Nations Practice, 1961 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 269.
[Vol. 17
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as sources for interpretation and clarification of the original articles
of the United Nations Charter.
In the final decision to use military force, considerations of inter-
national law may not be determinative, giving way to political and
public pressures. Nevertheless, legality is important particularly for
the United States, a nation that prides itself as being governed by
the rule of law and that has striven to create an international order
based on the rule of law.1 The battle against terrorism presents no
exception; it too must be waged within the rules of international
law.8 If respect for international norms is to be preserved, the
United States must lead by example. To resort to illegal means in
order to combat terrorism sets an undesirable precedent. Unlawful
use of force only encourages further illegal force. Breach invites
counterbreach.
Legality also impacts on the morality of the cause. Moral right-
eousness of the action will be enhanced or be diminished according
to its perceived legality. The United States asserts that it has a
moral right to act against terrorism. 9 But moral imperatives will
not persuade the world community to ignore a breach of interna-
tional law. Action in accord with international norms, on the other
hand, is a powerful influence on world opinion.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
President Reagan, in an address concerning terrorism before the
American Bar Association, made passing mention of former Presi-
dent Theodore "Teddy" Roosevelt. 10 The contrast in constraints
imposed by international law between the eras of the two Presi-
dents underscores the evolution of international law wrought by the
League of Nations and the United Nations.
President Roosevelt would have been expected to respond to ter-
7. For a further discussion of the U.S. role in international law, see Chayes, Nicara-
gua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (1985).
8. Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, in a recent article
dealing with terrorism emphasized that "[w]e must persist in asserting that the rule of law
be obeyed, if we want to retain the hope that some day it will be obeyed." Sofaer, Fighting
Terrorism Through Law, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1985, at 38, 39.
9. Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 12,
16.
10. Address by President Ronald Reagan, "The New Network of Terrorist States,"
before the American Bar Association, in Washington, D.C. (July 8, 1985). Theodore
Roosevelt was President 1901-1908.
19871
3
Stuesser: Active Defense: State Military Response to International Terroris
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
rorist attacks; such was the practice of states at that time." No
multinational organization existed to oversee disputes in interna-
tional affairs. States relied on their own self-help remedies.' 2 War,
the ultimate sanction, remained largely unregulated. To be sure,
the concept of "just war" had evolved in international legal theory,
but had not been translated into practice. War remained an ac-
cepted tool of statecraft. Resort to force, war if necessary, was gov-
erned primarily by three realities: a) domestic support for the ac-
tion-political reality; b) anticipated forceful reaction of other
"powers"--diplomatic reality; and c) likelihood of success of the
military operation. This paradigm culminated in the First World
War which was "sparked" by a terrorist act, the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo."3
The carnage of the First World War made the option of war less
acceptable to states and in fact the League of Nations was created
to regulate war."4 The Covenant of the League imposed two radical
changes:
1) Signatory states were obliged to employ pacific means for set-
tling disputes and not to resort to war without first exhausting
those pacific means; and
2) Members of the League were empowered to pass judgment on
the legality under the Covenant of any state's resort to war and to
apply sanctions against a state in violation of the Covenant.'5
The Second World War marked the final failure of the League.
The greater devastation of this war impelled the international com-
munity to prepare once again to "save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war."' 6 The United Nations was molded by the fail-
11. In 1899, the European Powers, Japan and the United States combined in a classic
illustration of state intervention to suppress the so-called Boxer Rebellion in China.
12. For a comprehensive review of the self-help remedies, restoration, reprisal and in-
tervention, see J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963); L. OPPEN-
HEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
13. There is no suggestion that the assassination "caused" the First World War; rather
it was the immediate precipitating event.
14. See Covenant of the League of Nations, art. XII, in HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 1 (1933), which restricted "resort to war." An arguable gap in the Covenant
was that it did not address lesser forms of armed force. For a discussion of this issue, see
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
RECUEIL DES CouRs 454 (1952).
15. Waldock, supra note 14, at 469. Articles X-XVI of the Covenant dealt with the
regulation of war, obligations and sanctions. The essence of the League system was to com-
pel member states to submit disputes to arbitration, judicial settlement or inquiry by the
Council prior to a "resort to war" and not to go to war until three months after a decision
was rendered. Further, a state was obliged not to go to war against a member state comply-
ing with any stipulated decision.
16. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
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ures of its predecessor and by the now recognized horror of war.
Under the Charter of the United Nations, "the threat or use of
force" in international relations is prohibited. ' The one express ex-
ception to this general prohibition on the use of force available to
an individual state acting unilaterally is the right of self-defense as
outlined in Article 51 of the Charter. Under the Charter, individual
recourse-gives way to collective enforcement action through the Se-
curity Council.18 The Security Council is designed to ensure
"prompt and effective action by the United Nations" to maintain
"international peace and security."1 9 If necessary, the Security
Council is authorized to respond with military measures.2 0 Such is
the ideal. In reality, the Security Council is paralyzed by the con-
flicting interests of the five permanent members wielding the power
to veto any proposed action. Given the inability of the Security
Council to enforce international law, the validity of the entire
United Nations normative structure is in jeopardy. Sir Humphrey
Waldock, writing during the infancy of the United Nations, warned
that "[a] legal system which merely prohibits use of force and does
not make adequate provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes
invites failure." 21 For some, Sir Humphrey's prophecy has come to
pass and the failure of the United Nations to act compels states to
act unilaterally.
Thomas Franck, for one, spoke of the death of Article 2(4) of the
Charter, the general prohibition on the use of force, and foresaw
the evolution of a new norm in international affairs premised on
super-power spheres of interest.22 Professor Michael Reisman, with-
out pronouncing the demise of Article 2(4), reinterpreted it.23 He
maintained that Article 2(4) must be applied to enhance the "fun-
damental principle of political legitimacy in contemporary interna-
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." See also art. 2, para. 3: "All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not
endangered."
18. Chapter Vill of the Charter permits the use of force through regional arrange-
ments and Chapter VII of the Charter allows military action through the Security Council
on behalf of the United Nations.
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
21. Waldock, supra note 14, at 456.
22. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force
by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
23. Reisman, Coercion and Self-determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984).
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tional politics"-self-determination.14 He proposed to bypass inef-
fective collective security by allowing individual states to
unilaterally pursue and enforce the aims of the United Nations
Charter. The fundamental test will be: "Will a particular use of
force enhance or undermine world order?"25 For Professor Reis-
man, ensuring free choice for suppressed peoples and deposing re-
pressive regimes enhances world order. Professor Reisman's view of
Article 2(4) expands the permissible bounds of the unilateral use of
force from that necessary for self-defense to that resorted to in the
"good cause" of self-determination. Oscar Schachter, in a scathing
rebuttal, saw this as an "ominous" proposal, pointing to the "his-
toric realities of abuse by powerful states for supposedly good
causes."26 The most poignant legal argument against the Franck
and Reisman theses is that no state has chosen to "opt out" or to
"reinterpret" the United Nations international order. As Louis
Henkin noted in his defense of the Charter norms,
[a~ll of the evidence is persuasive that they [the draftsmen of the
Charter] sought to outlaw war, whether or not the U.N. organiza-
tion succeeded in enforcing the law or in establishing peace and
justice. And none of the original members, nor any one of the
many new members, has ever claimed that the law against the use
of force is undesirable now that the United Nations is not what
had been intended.2
7
For states, the law remains the United Nations Charter as
drafted, interpreted and applied by them through their representa-
tives. And it is generally accepted that the Charter prohibits the
unilateral use of force except in self-defense. These, then, are the
legal parameters within which "active defense" is to be judged by
the community of states.28
II. THE STATUS OF REPRISALS
The Security Councils' inability to enforce the provisions of the
Charter has also spawned efforts to resurrect reprisal as an accept-
able form of state action.2 9 Reprisal is seen as one means of nar-
24. Id. at 643.
25. Id.
26. Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 650
(1984).
27. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 138 (2d ed. 1979).
28. The United Nations has become a truly universal organization with 159 member
states as of January 1, 1985. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE. TREATIES IN FORCE (1985).
29. See Falk, supra note 2; Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66
[Vol. 17
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rowing the alleged "credibility gap" between international norms
and state practice, particulary in light of the conflict in the Middle
East.30 Reprisals "permit" the illegal use of force by a state to re-
dress wrongs committed by another state. They also have a long
history in international affairs.3 ' The conditions requisite for a le-
gitimate reprisal action under customary international law are:
1) a prior delict by another state under international law;
2) an unsuccessful demand for redress; and
3) a reasonable, proportional forceful response.32
Reprisals are differentiated from self-defense largely in terms of
object. Reprisals focus on the wrongdoer state and are intended to
punish the wrongdoer for past delicts. Obviously, punishment also
contains an element of future deterrence in that the wrongdoer
state is coerced through force to act appropriately or face further
reprisals.
The focus of self-defense, on the other hand, is on the victim
state. In this context, action is taken to prevent future injury to the
state. A harm exists and the state acts to address that harm. Ad-
mittedly, the distinction between self-defense and reprisals blurs in
the state of quasi-belligerency existing between Israel and her Arab
neighbors. Given the cycle of violence and ever present danger, cer-
tain Israeli military responses can be seen as being both reactive
and preventive and thus classified as acts either of self-defense or of
reprisal.33
Self-defense and reprisal can be visualized as two circles in a
venn diagram. The circles overlap to encompass a quarter portion
of each. Critically, the overlap area remains within the circle of
self-defense and acts falling in this field can be so justified even
though they can also be thought of as reprisals. Nevertheless, the
overlap does not rationalize general acceptance of reprisal.
For example, in his work on reprisals, Falk provides a framework
for "legal reprisals" to guide state action. 4
Twelve criteria are outlined in which are all the essential elements
of self-defense among which are:
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972).
30. Bowett, supra note 29, at 1.
31. For an overview of the law of reprisals, see L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, at 135-
43; Waldock, supra note 14, at 456-61.
32. Waldock, supra note 14, at 460.
33. Falk, supra note 2, at 434-35; Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense. The Custom-
ary Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (1972).
34. Falk, supra note 2, at 441-42.
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1) The purpose of the force is defensive, to protect the state (Point
2);
2) The force is necessary in the sense that all reasonable pacific
means are exhausted and the state must resort to extraterritorial
action (Points 4 and 9);
3) The force used is proportional to the danger presented and is
directed against military and para-military targets and precautions
are taken to avoid excessive damage and unnecessary loss of life
(Points 5 and 6); and
4) The user of the force promptly reports and explains its conduct
to the appropriate multinational organization-presumably the Se-
curity Council as required under Article 51 (Point 7).
Compliance with the twelve criteria brings the state action into the
rubric of self-defense-into the area of overlap.
Supporters of "legal reprisal" refer to the selective contradiction
in the decisions of the Security Council in failing to condemn all
acts of reprisal.35 They argue that since there is no blanket condem-
nation of reprisal, reasonable reprisals are acceptable. Yet, in-
stances where the Security Council failed to condemn can be seen
as falling within the acceptable parameters of self-defense. Invaria-
bly, the justification for not responding to such acts was self-de-
fense."6 Failure to condemn, therefore, can be seen as quasi-accept-
ance of the self-defense argument and ought not be construed as an
endorsement of "legal reprisal."
Nor is it desirable to recognize reprisal as a legitimate use of
force. Reprisals are inherently open to abuse by states. Any delict
or any unfriendly act by a state could provide the pretense for mili-
tary intervention by the aggrieved state. Furthermore, reprisals are
a remedy only available to the powerful, that is, those who are in a
military position to act. In these circumstances, the potential for
abuse is enormous, especially when the fundamental purpose of re-
prisals is to "coerce" appropriate state behavior. Also of concern
are reprisals between equally powerful states which are likely to
escalate to war. 7 Continuing censure and condemnation of such
practice is a far better course, for in an international community
lacking in active enforcement, vocal world condemnation remains a
valid deterrence.
During the period of heightened debate over reprisals, the United
35. Bowett, supra note 29; Levenfeld, supra note 2, at 35.
36. See Bowett, supra note 29, at 33-36.
37. Waldock, supra note 14, at 459.
[Vol. 17
8
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol17/iss1/2
RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Nations responded with its own statement. The General Assembly
adopted by consensus the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States which specifically addressed reprisals: "States have a duty to
refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."38 In 1974,
the United States, when pressed to accept reprisals under interna-
tional law, responded with an open letter from Acting Secretary of
State Kenneth Rush:
The United States has supported and supports the foregoing prin-
ciple [state duty to refrain from forceful acts of reprisal]. Of
course we recognize that the practice of States is not always con-
sistent with this principle and that it may sometimes be difficult
to distinguish the exercise of proportionate self-defense from an
act of reprisal. Yet, essentially for reasons of the abuse to which
the doctrine of reprisals particularly lends itself, we think it desir-
able to endeavor to maintain the distinction between acts of law-
ful self-defense and unlawful reprisals.3 9
The distinction between self-defense and reprisal is material to
the issue of "active defense." To reiterate, self-defense is the only
exception to the general prohibition on the unilateral use of force
by a state. Other self-help remedies, of which reprisal is one, are
illegal under the Charter. 0 "Active defense" must be framed
within self-defense.
A. Article 51: Self-Defense
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the ex-
ercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
38. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Doc. A/8082 (1970).
39. Letter from Acting Secretary of State Rush to Professor Eugene Rostow of the
Yale Law School (May 29, 1974), reprinted in part in 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1974).
40. Another term recently coined to apply to Israel's use of force in the Entebbe Raid
is "rectification." This concept can be summarized as a form of state restoration to the status
quo. "Rectification," like reprisal, is a self-help remedy without justification under the U.N.
Charter. See Sheehan, The Entebbe -Raid: The Principle of Self-Help in International Law
as Justification for State Use of Armed Force, I FLETCHER F. 135 (1977).
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order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Article 51 does not define self-defense. However, under custom-
ary international law, general principles have evolved to guide
states in applying self-defense.
A reference point is the Caroline case where self-defense "was
changed from a political excuse to a legal doctrine. '4 2 The Caroline
incident occurred during the aftermath of the unsuccessful Rebel-
lion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. The rebellion
aroused sympathy and support in the American border states. Sym-
pathy turned to active assistance. The Caroline was a steam boat
used by American "volunteers" to ferry men and supplies to a con-
tingent of men who had seized Navy Island, a British possession in
the Niagara River. From the island, the band allegedly committed
"repeated Acts of Warlike aggression on the Canadian shore, and
also on British Boats passing the Island.' '1 3 The British responded.
A force crossed the Niagara River at night, boarded the Caroline,
set the boat on fire and towed her into the current to be swept over
Niagara Falls. Two Americans were killed in the boarding."
Exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the
United States and Britain followed. 48 In these notes, Daniel Web-
ster, then Secretary of State, outlined a framework for self-defense.
He called on the British government to show a
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to
show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing
the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territo-
ries if the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or exces-
sive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must
be limited by the necessity, and kept clearly within it.
46
Of binding importance is that the British government accepted the
framework, although it disagreed over the facts.
Two guiding principles for self-defense emerge from the Caroline
case: necessity for action and proportionality of any response.
Moreover, for the purposes of "active defense," the Caroline case
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
42. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
43. Id. at 83.
44. Id. at 84.
45. The most intense diplomatic activity occurred after 1840 following the arrest of
Alexander McLeod, a British subject, in New York state and charged with murder and
arson in connection with the Caroline incident. See generally, id. at 85.
46. Id. at 89.
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presented an instance where a state responded to armed infringe-
ments by "individuals" which prompted a military incursion into
the territory of another sovereign state. The Caroline case also sup-
ports the principle of anticipatory self-defense, although within nar-
row, prescribed limits. The Webster formulation did not require an
actual attack; response to a threat was permissible so long as the
danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation. 7 Indeed, the British ac-
tion can be seen as an example of essentially a pre-emptive strike to
prevent the transport of further supplies to Navy Island and to
stem the perceived threat of an insurgent invasion.
Article 51 leaves unaltered the principles of necessity and of pro-
portionality and United Nations practice confirms an emphasis of
these principles. 48 Necessity is comprised of two factors. First, the
danger presented must warrant a military response. In this way,
military reactions to unfriendly economic or political actions by
states are eliminated and self-defense is confined to a response to
an "armed attack" under Article 51. Second, peaceful alternative
means of settlement must be exhausted.4 9 In this way, the obliga-
tions of Article 2(3) to pursue peaceful means of dispute resolution
are met. Thus, necessity minimizes the opportunities to use force.
Proportionality, on the other hand, minimizes the amount of force
used once it is necessary; that is, proportionality prevents a state
from using massive force in response to a minor incident."
What is not settled is whether the customary law of anticipatory
self-defense remains unaffected by Article 51. International law
scholarship is divided over this issue. One school of thought is that
Article 51 merely declares customary international law; a second
sees Article 51 as fashioning a new, more restrictive statement of
self-defense.
47. Id.
48. R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITI-
CAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 205 (1963).
49. On June 7, 1981, Israeli aircraft destroyed a nuclear reactor in Iraq. The Security
Council unanimously condemned the attack. 36 U.N. SCOR (2288 mtg.), S.C. Res. 487
(1981). The United States' vote was "based solely on the conviction that Israel failed to
exhaust peaceful means for the resolution of the dispute." Id. See also, Mallison, The Israel
Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor. Aggression or Self-De-
fense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417 (1982); Nydell, Tensions Between International Law
and Strategic Security: Implications of Israel's Preemptive Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor,
24 VA. J. INT'L L. 459 (1984).
50. The most poignant example of an attempted abuse of self-defense was the German
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The restrictive interpretation relies on the literal qualification
contained in Article 51 "if an armed attack occurs." Arguably,
these words are redundant if the concept of anticipatory self-de-
fense is still valid. Moreover, a restrictive interpretation is
presented as being consistent with the net effect and intent of the
Charter to go beyond customary international law in prohibiting
unilateral state resort to force. Article 51 is also seen as comple-
menting the general prohibition on the use of force contained in
Articles 2(3) and 2(4)."1
In reply, supporters of anticipatory self-defense raise, in general
terms, three objections to the restrictive interpretation: Supporters
challenge the "literalism" of Article 51, refer to the contrary intent
manifested by the original Charter drafters and cite the unaccept-
able consequences flowing from a narrow application of self-
defense.
Challenges of the literal reading of Article 51 concern the reaffir-
mation in the article of the "inherent right" of self-defense. Refer-
ence is also made to the French text of Article 51 and its less cate-
gorical statement that self-defense is available to a member state
which is "the object of armed aggression." 2 Supporters of the idea
of anticipatory self-defense also argue that the limitation in the ar-
ticle was intended only as a "hypothetical" and was not inserted as
a condition for action.
5 3
The travaux preparatoires of the Charter5 ' are cited in further
support of the theory that Article 51 was not intended by the draft-
ers of the Charter to restrict customary international law and that
a marked departure from customary international law is not to be
lightly presumed. In the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, an
article dealing with self-defense was not included.55 This was con-
sistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kel-
logg-Briand pact, neither of which addressed, and therefore pre-
served, the customary right of self-defense. In the case of the
51. See generally, L. HENKIN, supra note 27; Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-
Defense, 1961 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183.
52. As quoted in Brownlie, supra note 51, at 242, the French text reads: "Dans un
cas ou un Membre des Nations Unies est l'object d'une aggression armee." The Spanish text
reads: "En caso de ataque armando."
53. Comment, The Legal Implications of Israel's 1982 Invasion into Lebanon, 13
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 458, 481 (1983).
54. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27 (1969), provides for recourse to "supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty."
55. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization, U.N.C.I.O.
Doc. I G/I (1945).
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Kellogg-Briand Pact, certain states went on to expressly reserve
their unqualified right to act in self-defense.
56
What then was the intent in inserting "if an armed attack oc-
curs" in Article 51? First, the phrase is not redundant. Its purpose
was to clarify the principle of collective self-defense under regional
pacts.5 7 It was not- intended to affect individual state-defense.
Strong support for this view is found in the travaux preparatoires.
In committee, the representative from Columbia, in approving the
adoption of the new paragraph (Article 51), stated:
If a group of countries with regional ties declare [sic] their [sic]
solidarity for their [sic] mutual defense, as in the case of the
American states, they [sic] will undertake such defense jointly if
and when one of them is attacked. And the right of defense is not
limited to the country which is the direct victim of aggression but
extends to those countries which have established solidarity,
through regional arrangements, with the country directly at-
tacked .... From this, it may be deduced that the approval of this
article implies that the Act of Chapultepec is not in contravention
of the Charter.68
Yet, the most forceful criticism of the restrictive interpretation is
that it simply is not logical for a state to wait and allow a poten-
tially devastating or lethal first strike before acting to protect itself.
A state cannot be expected to turn cheek and allow itself to be
attacked, and perhaps destroyed, especially when the Security
Council is ineffective in turning back the aggressor.
In rebuttal, adherents of the restrictive interpretation stress the
need for a clear, unambiguous line to determine self-defense. The
existence of an armed attack before action represents such a con-
crete demarcation. Otherwise, vagueness invites abuse. According
to this reasoning, the development of modern lethal weapons makes
limitation more imperative, not less, in order to avoid miscalculated
anticipatory strikes. The rationale for preemptive nuclear strikes
also wanes with the development of second and third strike capabil-
ities of the respective nuclear super-powers. 59
56. See Brownlie, supra note 51, at 205.
57. Waldock, supra note 14, at 497.
58. U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 576, 111/4/2 (May 25, 1945). The representatives of Mexico,
Costa Rica, Paraguay, Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama, Uruguay, Peru, Guate-
mala, El Salvador, Brazil, Honduras and Cuba associated themselves with this statement.
Further support for this view is found in the strongly reiterated position of the Soviet
Union that the appropriate placement of the new paragraph (Article 51) was in Chapter
VIII which deals with regional arrangements. U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 972, 111/6 (June 14, 1945).
59. Louis Henkin, a prominent adherent to the restrictive interpretation, concedes that
1987]
13
Stuesser: Active Defense: State Military Response to International Terroris
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The debate continues over the proper interpretation of Article 51.
Fortunately, to understand responses to terrorism, these positions
need not be reconciled. "Active defense" implies a response to prior
terrorist attacks. If the terrorist acts are of a sufficient intensity to
constitute an "armed attack" then "active defense" can be brought
within the most restrictive interpretation of Article 51.
This is also the most acceptable argument to raise before the
United Nations given that the most likely forum for debate will be
the Security Council. Pursuant to Article 51, a state relying on self-
defense "shall" report to the Security Council. United Nations'
practice indicates a cautious approach to self-defense and a prefer-
ence "not to give rein" to anticipatory self-defense.60 This is not to
say that the United Nations endorses a restrictive interpretation;
rather, state resort to force is closely scrutinized by other member
states for fear of creating too broad an exception.6" Accordingly, a
high standard of persuasion is demanded of a state asserting self-
defense.
III. TERRORIST ATTACKS As "ARMED ATTACK"
Just as Article 51 does not define self-defense, so too is the
phrase "armed attack" left undefined. Certainly, the adjective
"armed" implies a military application of force. Economic, political
and propaganda "attacks" against another nation do not give rise
to the right of self-defense. What is not resolved is the type and
magnitude of armed attack needed to legitimize a state response in
self-defense.
The traditional instance of self-defense, an armed invasion of one
state by the military forces of another state, involves the direct
committal of forces by the respective states. Yet, self-defense is not
confined to direct state attacks. In 1958, the Lebanese representa-
tive speaking before the Security Council addressed his country's
right to self-defense in the face of alleged indirect subversion by the
United Arab Republic:
Article 51 of the Charter speaks not of direct armed attack but of
armed attack pure and simple. Article 51 is thus intended to
a nuclear holocaust represents an extreme situation beyond the realm of law: "If a nation is
satisfied that another is about to obliterate it, it will not wait .... But surely that extreme
hypothetical case beyond the realm of law should not be used to justify new rules for situa-
tions that do not involve the impending mortal thrust." L. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 142-43.
60. R. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 203.
61. Levenfeld, supra note 2, at 17.
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cover all cases of attack, whether direct or indirect, provided it is
armed attack. In any case, what difference is there from the point
of view of their effects between direct and indirect attack if both
are directed towards the destruction of a country's independence
and could, in fact, threaten it? What real difference is there be-
tween armed soldiers in uniform making a frontal attack on a
certain part of a certain country and these same soldiers, armed
but not in uniform, secretly infiltrating into the area to regroup
there and engage in the same sort of armed attack as soldiers in
uniform?
62
This proposition of law is consistent with customary state prac-
tice. For example, the British seizure and destruction of the Caro-
line was in response to acts committed by Canadian "rebels" and
American "volunteers. '"63 Webster's famous formula for self-de-
fense did not require the ingredient of direct state involvement. Ne-
cessity arose from a danger-any danger. In this vein, the United
States, citing self-defense, made repeated incursions into neighbor-
ing Mexico in pursuit of hostile Indians or outlaw bands in the 19th
and early 20th centuries. 4
In the post-Charter era, the United States has remained a lead-
ing proponent of the view that "indirect aggression" is contrary to
the general prohibition on the use of force and that a state should
not escape incrimination behind the shield of subversion. The
United States' perspective was, in large part, a "cold war" reaction
to the fear of communist inspired subversion. Not surprisingly,
American and British jurists have provided the strongest scholarly
support for self-defense in response to indirect attacks.6 Kelsen,
writing in 1952, stated that
[t]he illegal attack may be the action of individuals not acting as
organs of another state, but operating from the territory of an-
other state. Then the attacked state exercises its right of self-de-
62. 13 U.N. SCOR (833d mtg.) at 3 (1958).
63. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
64. M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS OF PRI-
VATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 120-22 (1962).
65. A summary of United States pronouncements on this issue is contained in Chayes,
Nicaragua, The United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445, 1456-67
(1985). Professor Chayes was counsel for Nicaragua in its case before the World Court
against the United States for the latter's support of contra activity against Nicaragua and
for the mining of Nicaragua harbors. Professor Chayes noted the irony that the concept of
"indirect aggression" was now being used against the United States.
66. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1966);
R. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 201; Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed
Bands, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 712, 731 (1958); Schachter, The Right of States to Use
Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1638 (1984).
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fense by using force against these individuals on the territory of
the other state only if the latter has violated its obligations to take
the measures to prevent or repress the illegal attack."
The subsequent edition to Kelsen's work directly addressed the
term "armed attack" as used in Article 51:
By an armed attack may also be understood, however, the support
by one state of revolutionary groups within the territory of an-
other state. More generally, there are a number of ways in which
force may be used indirectly by a state that may be interpreted as
constituting an armed attack, for example, the arming by a state
of organized bands for offensive purposes against another state,
the sending by a state of so-called "volunteers" to engage in hos-
tilities with another state, the undertaking or encouragement by a
state of terrorist activities in another state or the toleration by a
state of organized activities calculated to result in terrorist acts
in another state, and so on.
8
Underlying the resort to self-defense is acceptance of the reality
that acts of irregulars, armed bands or terrorist groups have a seri-
ous impact, in fact having contributed to the toppling of govern-
ments in the past. The victim state is forced to allocate scarce re-
sources in defense against such attack. Relations between the
victim state and support states sour, increasing the likelihood of
open conflict. Violent incidents arouse both fear and anger in the
general population. The result is an unsettled and dangerous
situation.
Although there is general agreement that acts of armed bands
may constitute armed attacks, there is not consensus over the mag-
nitude of force needed to trigger a state response in self-defense.
One view is that self-defense by a state is justified only in the event
of an invasion by armed bands such that "the territorial integrity of
the invaded state is seriously impaired."69 A contrasting position is
that "[a]rmed attacks, even those small in scope, are still consid-
ered armed attack. '17 Neither of these two extremes is acceptable.
The former is too restrictive, leaving self-defense available only
when the very preservation of the state is at risk. No state can be
expected to wait for that threshold. The latter is too open to abuse,
permitting response to every instance of hostility, regardless of in-
67. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (1952).
68. H. KELSEN, supra note 66, at 62 (emphasis added).
69. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 64, at 119.
70. Feinstein, Self-Defense and Israel in International Law: A Reappraisal,- 11 ISRAEL
L. REV. 516, 540 (1976).
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tensity or the existence of a future danger.
An acceptable framework lies somewhere in between the two ex-
tremes posed. Brownlie, while recognizing that armed attack "prob-
ably refers to some grave breach of the peace, or invasion by a
large organized force . . ..", concluded that response to lesser acts
committed by armed bands could not be ruled out:
It is extremely unlikely if negligence in permitting armed bands
to operate from State territory constitutes an "armed attack" on
the State which they penetrate; and isolated or sporadic opera-
tions by bands with government complicity are probably not suffi-
ciently serious to come within the meaning of article 51. How-
ever, it is conceivable that a coordinated and general campaign by
powerful bands of irregulars, with obvious or easily proven com-
plicity of the government of the State from which they operate,
would constitute an "armed attack," more especially if the object
was the forcible settlement of a dispute or the acquisition of
territory.
7 1
Higgins concurred in this view:
Thus the question was raised: if a state has been subjected, over a
period of time, to border raids by nationals of another state,
which are openly supported by the government of that state, to
threats of a future, and possibly imminent, large-scale attack, and
to the harassments of alleged belligerent rights, may it use force
in self-defense, in anticipation of the continuation of such action?
The present writer is of the opinion that that question, thus
phrased, must be answered affirmatively-but always with the
proviso that the action in self-defense is proportionate, in nature
and degree to the prior illegality or the imminent attack.
72
Seriousness of the danger posed must be assessed first by the victim
state in deciding to respond with force and subsequently by the
world community deliberating on that decision. Both Brownlie and
Higgins require a campaign of attacks as past and present incidents
are indicative of future danger. State response to sporadic or iso-
lated attacks is ruled out.
Are terrorist attacks sufficient to constitute "armed attack?" Jus-
tification of self-defense is easy for a state faced with a guerilla
army invading from a nearby state. The source of that threat is a
well organized, powerful armed band. Terrorism does not involve
territorial acquisition. Its modus operandi is violent, unpredictable
71. Brownlie, supra note 66, at 731 (footnote omitted)
72. R. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 201.
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destruction of property or of human lives. The source of terrorism
is traditionally viewed as a fanatical fringe, perceived as small
bands of terrorists. 
7
However, the present Middle East affairs offer a new situation.
Quantitatively, the terrorists' threat is magnified. Terrorism is no
longer the activity of isolated individuals; it is a tactic employed by
armed bands. The various Palestinian liberation organizations, with
an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 men under arms, are paramilitary in
structure and training.74 These groups constitute a real military and
political factor in the Middle East. They have partisan and state
support and are well armed. The danger presented by these armed
bands is far in excess of isolated terrorist attacks from small terror-
ist bands. Therefore, in responding to terrorist incidents, the state
must consider the perpetrator as well as the frequency and intensity
of past attacks. A campaign of terrorist attacks undertaken by
armed bands falls within the guidelines suggested by Brownlie and
Higgins.
A state's right to respond extraterritorially to terrorist attacks by
armed bands by asserting self-defense can be criticized in that the
response is entirely anticipatory.71 Anticipatory self-defense, pre-
sumably not permitted under Article 51, is being revived. After all,
the terrorist attacks are past and any state response is purely a pre-
ventive action against possible future danger. In reply, there is a
critical distinction to be made between a state response following
an armed attack and a state response in a vacuum against armed
threats. A state, the victim of terrorist attacks, is reacting to these
past incidents and is acting to prevent their reoccurrence. The
aminus, the intention to use force, has been manifested by the ter-
rorist organizations. Actions have gone beyond preparation or
threats and there is no doubt as to past, present or future violent
73. Coming to mind are the activities of the Weathermen of the United States, the
FLQ (Le Front de Liberation du Quebec) in Canada, the Baader-Meinhof gang in West
Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy.
74. MACLEAN'S, Oct. 21, 1985, at 39. Twelve major Palestinian factions are noted: Al
Fatah-headed by Yasser Arafat, 8,000 fighters; Palestine Liberation Front-a small pro-
Arafat wing under Abdul-Abbas and a pro-Syrian wing under Talatt Yaloub, 100 fighters;
Arab Liberation Front-backed by Iraq and headed by Abdul-Rahim Ahmed; Black
June-headed by Abu Nidal and opposed to Arafat; Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-Syrian supported, headed by Nayif Nawatmch; Al Intifada-based in Syria
under Colonel Saed (Abu) Musa, 2,500 fighters; Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine-pro Syrian, headed by George Habash, 1,000 fighters; Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine-General Command-pro Syrian, led by Ahmed Jabril, 800 fighters; Popu-
lar Struggle Front-Syrian backed, under Samir Ghusha. Others estimate 22 radical
Palestinian groups. NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 1986, at 26.
75. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 64, at 119.
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intent.7  Moreover, the issue of proportionality of response has a
fixed reference; the past attacks provide a gauge to assess the rea-
sonableness of any state action. In the absence of prior attacks, pro-
portionality must be vaguely determined in light of ambiguous
threats to use force.
7
7
A requirement that states respond only to existing, present ter-
rorist attacks is also unreal. The very purpose of terrorist tactics is
to avoid direct confrontation with state forces. Quite simply, states
rarely succeed in catching terrorists in the act. To limit state re-
sponse to only existing attacks results in a mute application of Arti-
cle 51. The requirement in Article 51 is "if an armed attack oc-
curs." There is no stipulation that the response in self-defense be
confined to an immediate armed attack. As Brownlie suggests,
"[in all probability the question which should be posed is not when
is anticipatory action justified but, when has an attack occurred? 1 78
The following conclusion from a recent article by Schachter
presents a logical proposition of law:
[I]t does not seem unreasonable, as a rule, to allow a state to
retaliate beyond the immediate area of attack, when that state
has sufficient reason to expect a continuation of attacks (with sub-
stantial military weapons) from the same source. Such action
would not be "anticipatory" because prior attacks occurred; nor
would it be a "reprisal" since its prime motive would be protec-
tive, not punitive .... Thus, "defensive retaliation" may be justi-
fied when a state has good reason to expect a series of attacks
from the same source and such retaliation serves as a deterrent or
protective action.
9
It is one thing to justify state action against the actual perpetrators
of terrorist attacks; however, terrorists cannot be dealt with in iso-
lation. Any extraterritorial attack on terrorists per se or on terrorist
bases necessitates a forceful incursion into the territory of another
sovereign state which the intruding state must justify.
In taking action directly against the terrorists, justification is
76. For a discussion dealing with state intention, see R. TAOKA, THE RIGHT OF SELF-
DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 117-20 (1978). Taoka writes:
A man's intention which has not yet been translated into actual conduct may be
abandoned by him at any time. Furthermore, to determine, before it is translated
into action, the intention of a foreign government only by imagination, often leads to
error. A theory which relies upon the presumption of intention may increase the
possibility of unnecessary war.
Id. at 119.
77. Brownlie, supra note 51, at 227.
78. Id. at 258.
79. Schachter, supra note 66, at 1638.
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found in the terrorist incidents themselves. Certain acts such as
murder, hostage taking or bombings are universally recognized as
criminal, regardless of the motive prompting the acts.80 The United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents refers to the crimes of "murder, kidnapping or other at-
tack" against internationally protected persons. 81 And hostage tak-
ing was specifically addressed in the Convention Against the Tak-
ing of Hostages.8 At a regional level, the European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism, without defining terrorism, listed a
number of acts as crimes including "an offence involving the use of
a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel
bomb if this use endangers persons." 83
With respect to an incursion into the territory of another state,
justification rests on establishing a link between that state and the
perpetrators of the terrorist acts. Under international law, a state
may be held responsible for the act of private individuals. In the
interests of reciprocity between states, the right of a state to inde-
pendence creates a corresponding duty to respect the sovereign in-
tegrity of other states. There is a further duty imposed on states to
prevent harmful acts against other states. One school of thought
imposes absolute liability on states for injurious acts of private indi-
viduals operating from its territory.8' The underlying premise for
this view is that states are morally bound to promote world peace.
85
Absolute liability is not, however, generally accepted in interna-
tional law. Although it may be a tolerable theory on which to base
a claim for state compensation, it is an unacceptable basis to justify
an action in self-defense. Sovereignty and the territorial integrity of
nation states are paramount principles of international law and
ought not lightly be supervened.
The more generally accepted doctrine is that which links state
responsibility to its own fault, that is, its own acts of omission or
commission.a6 The principle that no state is responsible for acts of
80. See statements of Austrian representative to Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, 40
U.N. GAOR, Sixth Comm. (20th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/40/SR.20 (1985).
81. Annex to G.A. Res. 3166, 28 GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), art. 2(1)(a), U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1973) [hereinafter Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes).
82. G.A. Res. 146, 34 GAOR, U.N. Doe. A/34/819 (1983) [hereinafter International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages).
83. Europ. T.S. No. 97, art. I(e).
84. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 64, at 1-35.
85. Id. at 11.
86. H. KELSEN, supra note 67, at 121.
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its citizens without state culpability has firm roots in customary in-
ternational law and can be traced to the writings of Grotius and
Vattel.8 1 Garcia-Mora, an advocate of absolute liability, concedes
that "[g]overnmental complicity is a well-recognized ground of in-
ternational liability."88 International state practice applies this fault
principle. A classic case is St. Albans' Claim, an international arbi-
tration between the United States and Britain. 89 The United States
sought compensation from Britain for an attack on the town of St.
Albans, Vermont, in 1864 by a small band of Confederate sympa-
thizers who assaulted the town via Canadian territory. In the unan-
imous arbitration decision, the claim was denied on the ground that
the expedition was planned and carried out in such secrecy that the
harboring state could not be expected to know of its existence.
Compensation was not awarded in the absence of state fault.
The Corfu Channel Case90 is cited as further confirmation of this
principle in the post-United Nations context. 91 An interesting point
in that case was that the British never relied on an argument of
absolute liability in advancing its claim against Albania. The case
arose from a 1946 incident in which British warships were dam-
aged by mines in the Corfu Channel, within Albanian territorial
waters. Britain sought compensation from Albania. The British al-
leged three alternative grounds for Albanian responsibility: Albania
actually laid the mines; Albania in collusion with Yugoslavia laid
the mines; or Albania knew of the mine field and failed to warn.
Insufficient evidence was adduced to persuade the International
Court of Justice as to grounds one and two. The Court founded
responsibility on ground three, concluding that the laying of the
mine field "could not have been accomplished without the knowl-
edge of the Albanian government. 92 In imputing knowledge, the
Court ruled:
But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exer-
cised by a State over its territory and waters that that State nec-
essarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpe-
trated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have
known, the authors. The fact, by itself and apart from other cir-
cumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts
87. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 64, at 17-21.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id. at 64.
90. 1949 I.C.J. 4.
91. M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 64, at 22.
92. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
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the burden of proof.
93
Similarly, in terms of terrorist acts, state responsibility will not flow
simply from the fact that the terrorists originated from or operated
from a particular state. Complicity must be established between the
state and the terrorists.
The International Law Commission specifically addressed the is-
sue of armed bands and terrorist acts in the Draft Code of Offenses
against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 94 The following of-
fenses against the peace and security of mankind were included in
the draft:
Article 2, paragraph 4: The organization, or the encouragement
of the organization, by the authorities of a State, of armed bands
within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the
territory of another State, or the toleration of the organization of
such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by
such armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a
point of departure for incursions into the territory of another
State, as well as direct participation in or support of such
incursions.
Article 2, paragraph 6: The undertaking or encouragement by the
authorities of a State of terrorist activities in another State, or the
toleration by the authorities of a State of organized activities cal-
culated to carry out terrorist acts in another State.
The articles reassert customary international law. The net of re-
sponsibility attributed to a state is cast wide to include "encourage-
ment" or "toleration." Implicit in this is that, at a minimum, state
complicity means that a state has knowledge of the activities and
does not act to prevent them.
The Draft Code notably provided separate offenses for armed
bands and terrorists, differentiating between guerilla type "incur-
sions" and unspecified terrorist "activities." The distinction is not
so apparent. What happens when armed bands either lack the
power to mount full scale "incursions" into a state, although such
remains their ultimate purpose, and the "incursions" that are car-
ried out amount to hit and run terrorist strikes or there is a strate-
gic decision to resort to a terrorist campaign? In these circum-
stances, the distinction between armed bands and terrorist
organizations disappears; they are the one and the same. State cul-
pability can be grounded in either Paragraph 2(4) or Paragraph
93. Id. at 18.
94. 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
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2(6) of the Draft Code. This, then, is the situation in the Middle
East where armed bands have fused into terrorist organizations.
9 5
In a more recent pronouncement, the Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion among States explains in considering Article 2(4) of the
Charter:
Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing or encourag-
ing the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including
mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its ter-
ritory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the
acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of
force."
In accord with Article 2(7) of the Charter, which concerns non-
intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of states, the following pro-
hibition applies to member states: "Also, no State shall organize,
assist, ferment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the re-
gime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State."
The Declaration, seven years in the making, was adopted by con-
sensus in the General Assembly. Of importance is that, notwith-
standing the growth of the United Nations and the change in com-
position of the membership, the illegality of support for armed
bands and terrorism was reaffirmed.
The Definition of Aggression Resolution followed four years
later.9 The definition, like draft precursors dating back to 1933,
included reference to armed bands.98 Among the acts listed as ag-
gression is "[tihe sending by or on behalf of a State or armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to
95. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
96. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
97. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
98. For a complete summary of various draft definitions of aggression, see J. STONE,
AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRES-
SION app. (1958). In 1933, the League of Nations Committee on Security Questions drew up
a draft Definition of the Aggressor which included "provision of support to armed bands
formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwith-
standing the request of the invading State, to take in its own territory all the measures in its
power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection." Id. at 35.
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the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein." 99 This
clause is consensually ambiguous. It begins by confining state ag-
gression to the "sending" of armed bands. "Sending" implies state
control over the armed bands, in essence making them irregulars of
the state. This requirement is a more restrictive criterion than that
found in customary international law and not in agreement with
prior United Nations practice. But, the clause ends with the phrase
"or its substantial involvement therein." Presumably, "its" refers to
the state. What is not clear is whether "substantial involvement"
modifies "sending" or broadly speaks to basic support for the
armed bands. The latter interpretation conforms to prior interna-
tional law.
Israel vehemently condemned the definition as "unsatisfactory,"
"inadequate," "incomplete" and "deceptive."100 The definition
should not be considered entirely negatively from Israel's perspec-
tive. It reaffirms, as the Canadian representative pointed out, that
the "distinction between direct and indirect aggression was artifi-
cial."" Moreover, it recognizes that acts of armed bands can reach
a magnitude to constitute aggression. Although Israel would have
preferred a draft proposal by a number of Western States, the defi-
nition adopted does not go as far in restricting state response as the
one proposed by a group of non-aligned states' 02 which held that
[w]hen a State is a victim in its own territory of subversive and/
or terrorist acts by irregular, volunteer or armed bands organized
or supported by another State, it may take all reasonable and ad-
equate steps to safeguard its existence and its institutions, without
having recourse to the right of individual or collective self-defence
against the other State under Article 51 of the Charter.'
99. Definition of Aggression Resolution, supra note 97, art. 3, 1 g.
100. 29 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Comm. (1480th mtg.) at 94, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1480
(1974).
101. Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974) [hereinafter Report].
102. Draft proposals were presented by the Soviet Union, by a non-aligned group (Co-
lumbia, Cyprus, Equador, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Madagascar, Uganda and Yugosla-
via) and by a group of Western States (Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States). In the draft advanced by the Western States, among the aggressive means
listed were
-organizing, supporting or directing armed bands or irregular or volunteer forces
that make incursions or infiltrate into another State;
-organizing, supporting or directing violent civil strife or acts of terrorism in an-
other State; or
-- organizing, supporting or directing subversive activities aimed at the violent over-
throw of the Government of another State.
United Nations: Proposals on Defining Aggression, 8 INT'L LEG. MATS. 661 (1969).
103. Id. at 664.
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One can rationalize the use of the word "sending" as a reaction
to fear of anticipatory or pre-emptive strikes in that if support for
armed bands is an act of aggression, then victim states could use
that "aggression" to strike first. In demanding that a state "send"
forces into another state before a state may respond, attack by
armed bands must first occur. Thus, the potential abuse of anticipa-
tory attacks is avoided. Such a view is consistent with the position
advanced previously that in "active defense" a state is merely re-
sponding to prior armed attacks.
The definition of aggression is intended as a useful guide for the
Security Council in determining acts of aggression pursuant to Ar-
ticle 39 of the Charter.'" Aggression invariably includes a prior
determination of the question of self-defense in that states invaria-
bly justify their use of force as a defensive measure. Thus, self-
defense is a related factor to armed aggression. A definition of ag-
gression which includes political and economic coercion is too broad
a brush to paint the right of self-defense. But, armed aggression
does bestow on the victim state a right to defend itself against that
aggressor.
During the six years of discussion leading to the definition, notice
was taken of the relevance of the definition to the concept of self-
defense. The Netherlands' representative agreed with the Commit-
tee's decision to restrict the notion of aggression to the use of
armed force: "That [restriction] reduced the 'discordance' between
the choice of the word 'aggression' used in Article 39 of the Char-
ter and that of the term 'armed attack' -in Article 51. '"L5 The
Romanian representative in plainer terms stated that
[tihe fundamental purpose of the definition was to safeguard the
rights and lawful interests of the victim of aggression and to assist
it in defending itself against the aggressor. Every case of aggres-
sion constituted at the same time a case of self-defense, which
was a lawful use of force. The definition of aggression thus con-
tributed to clarification of the right of self-defense in response to
armed aggression, as enunciated in Article 51 of the Charter.1°6
104. Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (1971).
105. 29 U.N. GAOR Sixth Comm. (1473d mtg.) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1473
(1974).
106. 29 U.N. GAOR Sixth Comm. (1475th mtg.) at 60-61, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR
1475 (1974). See also the statement of the representative from West Germany, 29 U.N.
GAOR Sixth Comm. (1478th mtg.) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1748 (1974); the statement
of the representative from Cyprus, 29 U.N. GAOR Sixth Comm. (1479th mtg.) at 82, U.N.
Doc A/C.6/SR 1479 (1974); and the statement of the representative from Zambia, 29 U.N.
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Not all of the delegates concurred in this view: For example, the
United States' representative cautioned that the definition "neither
restricted nor expanded the inherent right of self-defense. ' 10 7 Ad-
mittedly, the definition does not provide a definition of self-defense;
nevertheless, the definition of aggression is relevant to the question
of self-defense and can be seen as contributing "toward the applica-
tion of Article 51."108
This analysis is in accord with the expressed intentions and con-
cerns of the original drafters of the United Nations Charter. The
United Nations and the Security Council were very much creations
to combat aggression. A definition of aggression was beyond the
capabilities of the drafters then and in a broad sense remains elu-
sive today. But, a right to respond to aggression was fundamental
to Article 51. In supporting the adoption of Article 5 1, the delegate
from Columbia, speaking for other Latin American states, equated
the "victim of aggression" with the "country directly attacked." 0 9
Armed attack and armed aggression were deemed synonymous." 0
In this way, the definition of armed aggression contained in Resolu-
tion 3314 provides a complementary guidepost in the determination
of "armed attack" under Article 51.
Detractors note that General Assembly resolutions are without
legal binding effect which taints any legal significance attached to
the resolutions."' States are characterized not as voting in terms of
principles, but primarily in terms of embellishing their world
images free from consequences. 2 Yet, a theory that resolutions are
merely pure political posturing denies the extensive efforts ex-
pended to achieve them and the subsequent reference and regard
afforded, both inside and outside of the United Nations, to General
Assembly resolutions.
True, resolutions are not listed among the traditional sources of
GAOR Sixth Comm. (1482d mtg.) at 112, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1482 (1974).
107. 29 U.N. GAOR Sixth Comm. (1480th mtg.) at 95, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1480
(1974).
108. Statement of the representative from Greece, 29 U.N. GAOR Sixth Comm.
(1482d mtg.) at III, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR 1482 (1974); statement of the representative
from the United Kingdom, 29 U.N. GAOR Sixth Comm. (1477th mtg.) at 70, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR 1477 (1974).
109. U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 576, 111/4/2 at 2 (May 25, 1945).
110. See J. STONE, supra note 98, at 75 and Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-
Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 877-78
(1947).
111. Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 RECUEIL DES COURS 434
(1972).
112. Id. at 457.
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international law. 113 Nor is the General Assembly a legislative body
empowered to create international law."' But this is not to say that
General Assembly resolutions are of no value. The Declaration on
Friendly Relations and the Definition of Aggression Resolution in
less formal ways do have effects which are recognized. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Case,118 for example,
referred extensively to General Assembly resolutions in ascertaining
the law concerning non-self-governing territories. And, relying on
the General Assembly resolutions, the Court concluded that self-
determination was the governing principle for such territories. In
the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Revised), the following reporter's note speaks to the "effect" of
"declaratory resolutions of international organizations:"
Nevertheless, given the universal character of many of these orga-
nizations and the forum they provide for the expression by states
of their views regarding legal principles, such resolutions may
provide important evidence of law. What states have done is, of
course, more weighty than their declarations or the resolutions
they vote for, but especially in the absence of other practice, a
resolution declaring the law is probative evidence of what the
states voting for the resolution regard as the state of international
law.116
Schachter referred to the "authority" of resolutions in expressing
the "general will" of the international community 1 7 and the extent
of "general will" should be tested against the composition and de-
gree of state support.118 Both the Declaration on Friendly Relations
and the Definition of Aggression Resolution were adopted by con-
sensus. No state was prepared to put the matter to a vote and then
cast a vote in the negative. Henkin wrote: "Nations that vote for a
particular statement of law cannot act quite as though they had not
done so. Those who do not agree with resolutions cannot wholly
disregard the views of a majority." 1 9 In the case of these resolu-
113. Statute of the International Court of Justice, T.S. No. 993 art. 38.
114. The General Assembly is authorized only to make recommendations under the
functions and powers accorded it by Articles 10-17 of the U.N. Charter.
115. 1975 I.C.J. 12.
116. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) 103 reporter's note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980)
117. Schachter, supra note 66, at 1622.
118. For an excellent example of the weighing of the voting composition behind the
General Assembly resolutions and the search for a "representative" consensus, see the arbi-
tration decision Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 INT'L LEG. MATS.
1-37 (1978).
119. L. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 181.
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tions, the majorities encompassed all. "Great importance" was at-
tached by the various state representatives to securing adoption by
consensus, thereby making it more difficult for a state to brush
aside the impact of the resolutions. 1 0
The General Assembly is perceived also as having a persuasive
function in declaring existing international norms and in achieving
the international community's acceptance of these norms. 2' The
Declaration on Friendly Relations is such an example. Article 3 of
the declaration contains that very proposition in which the General
Assembly declared that
[t]he principles of the Charter which are embodied in this Decla-
ration constitute basic principles of international law, and conse-
quently appeal[ed] to all States to be guided by these principles
in their international conduct and to develop their mutual rela-
tions on the basis of strict observance of these principles.
2 2
2
The imperative use of the word "shall" reiterates throughout the
declaration that the principles enunciated declare existing law
which states are expected to observe.
12 3
Further "authority" vests with the General Assembly, as an or-
gan of the United Nations, to interpret provisions of the Charter.
This is not to say that the General Assembly's interpretations are
authentic or binding on other organs of the United Nations.
Rather, the original drafters realized that each United Nations or-
gan would inevitably interpret parts of the Charter applicable to its
particular function.' 2' To have binding force within the organ, the
interpretation must be generally accepted by the member states.1
2
The Declaration on Friendly Relations purports to interpret various
principles derived from the Charter. For example, the principles
pertaining to support for armed bands evolve from Articles 2(4)
and 2(7) of the Charter. In the same fashion, the Definition of Ag-
gression Resolution interprets "aggression" as used in Article 39 of
the Charter. The definition is recognized as not binding the Secur-
ity Council. The resolution is presented as a guide for the Security
Council, reflecting the interpretation agreed to by the members of
120. Report, supra note 101, at 35.
121. J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 19 (1969).
122. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 96.
123. Rosenstock, supra note 104, at 715.
124. Report of the Rapporteur of Committee, U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 933 IV/2/42 at 7
(June 12, 1945).
125. Id. at 8. For a further discussion of this point, see Lachs, The Law in and of the
United Nations, 1 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 429 (1960).
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the General Assembly. 120
Within the context of the United Nations, the above resolutions
of the General Assembly have substantial authoritative force. The
Declaration on Friendly Relations, in particular, is viewed as a dec-
laration of existing international law. The Definition of Aggression
Resolution purports to reaffirm the provisions of this declaration.
Together they provide a powerful framework to justify state action
against terrorist and against terrorists supporting states: The Decla-
ration on Friendly Relations makes states' support for subversive
acts an international delict and the Definition of Aggression Reso-
lution accepts that such a delict can be viewed as aggression.
IV. DEFENSE OF NATIONALS
Most terrorist acts are directed at United States' interests and
nationals abroad and a policy of "active defense" is directed princi-
pally at the protection of Americans abroad. The question is raised:
Does the doctrine of self-defense extend to the defense of nationals
abroad?
Customary international law recognized a right of rescue to save
endangered nationals. 12 1 State practice is replete with instances of
protective actions-both pre- and post-United Nations era. "
Bowett characterized such intervention as a traditional part of cus-
tomary self-defense, and self-defense undeniably is the framework
applied to these cases.1  Waldock, in assessing the propriety of
protective interventions, relied on the criteria proposed in the Caro-
line case: "There must be (1) an imminent threat of injury to na-
tionals, (2) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sover-
eign to protect them and (3) measures of protection strictly
confined to the object of protecting them against injury."130 Corre-
spondingly, Israel, in defending its Entebbe action before the Se-
curity Council, relied on its inherent right of self-defense.131
126. Rosenstock, U.N. Special Committee Approves Draft Definition of Aggression,
70 DEP'T ST. BULL. 498 (1974).
127. A summary of authorities supporting this position is contained in Margo, The
Legality of the Entebbe Raid in International Law, 94 S. AFR. L.J. 306, 318 (1977).
128. For pre-U.N. instances, see D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
97 (1958); for post-U.N. instances, see Schachter, supra note 66, at 1628-33.
129. Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense, 38, 44 in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (J. Moore ed. 1974).
130. See, Waldock, supra note 14, at 467.
131. 31 U.N. SCOR (1939th mtg.) at 12-16, U.N. Doc. S/PV (1939). Following de-
bate, a draft resolution, S/12139, condemning the Israeli raid sponsored by Benin, Libya and
Tanzania, was withdrawn prior to a vote. The draft resolution sponsored by the United King-
1987]
29
Stuesser: Active Defense: State Military Response to International Terroris
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
What is recognized from the rescue cases is that a state does
have an obligation to protect its citizens abroad. Bowett refers to
the theory of social contract between state and subject which ac-
cepts the contentions
[tihat an injury to the nationals of a state constitutes an injury to
the state itself, and that the protection of nationals is an essential
function of the state. On this reasoning it is feasible to argue that
the defense of nationals, whether within or without the territorial
jurisdiction of the state, is in effect the defense of the state
itself. 132
In this way, defense of nationals and defense of the state are one
and the same.
Nor does Article 51 restrict this view. Its sole requirement is an
armed attack "against a Member of the United Nations." The
armed attack is not limited to that occurring within the territory of
the member state. Had the drafters so wished to confine self-de-
fense, the guiding words of Article 2(4) could have been duplicated
in requiring an armed attack against "the territorial integrity or
political independence" of a state.133 Thus, an extended interpreta-
tion of self-defense is not inconsistent with Article 51.
Moreover, a right of self-defense in protecting nationals goes be-
yond any theoretical notion of social contract. The reality of terror-
ist action is that, although nationals are the victims, the true target
is the state itself. Terrorism is politically motivated to coerce and
intimidate particular state governments. It represents a violent at-
tempt to influence the domestic and foreign policies of the victim
state. In such a situation, a state is being coerced by illegal external
uses of force.
Obviously, a threshold of coercion is demanded to justify a
defensive reaction.
To imperil the safety of a single national abroad is not to imperil
the security of the state; and yet there may be occasions when the
threat of danger is great enough, or wide enough in its application
to a sizable community abroad, for it to be legitimately construed
as an attack on the state itself.13
dom and the United States which condemned hijacking failed to receive the necessary nine
affirmative votes: six in favor, none against and two abstentions-seven members did not
vote. 31 U.N. SCOR, (1943d mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV (1943).
132. D. BOWETr, supra note 128, at 92.
133. Knisbacher, The Entebbe Operation: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Action,
12 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 57, 76 (1977).
134. D. BoWEr, supra note 128, at 93.
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The danger posed by a particular threat corresponds to the extent
of the terrorists' campaign and its effect on the target state and its
nationals. It is in this context that a right of self-defense may inure
to the target state.
V. NECESSITY FOR RESORT TO FORCE
Any state resort to force in response to terrorist attack must be
done out of necessity. Necessity comprises two elements: 1) the ex-
istence of a danger, and 2) the non-existence of reasonable peaceful
alternative measures.
The presence of a danger sufficient to warrant a response is very
much linked to the question of what constitutes an armed attack." '
There is, however, a change in emphasis to the future. The state
must justify to the world community that the menace of continued
armed attacks still persists. Future danger is a function of proof.
States will have to adduce evidence to show that a particular ter-
rorist organization perpetrated prior armed attacks as a part of an
organized campaign of terror against the state and that the organi-
zation remains in place to carry out similar future acts. The task is
a difficult one. Such is the concern regarding any use of force and
with any incursion into the sovereign territory of another state. The
world community will demand to see the evidence. The question of
the imminence of the danger, a fact which is virtually impossible
for the state to prove, is not a critical matter once the armed attack
occurs. The fact that a terrorist organization has attacked the state
and retains the means to continue the attacks makes the threat of
future violence ever imminent.
Besides the need to establish evidence of a sufficient danger, the
world community must also be convinced that the use of force is a
last resort. All reasonable peaceful alternatives, both domestically
and internationally, must have been exhausted.
A state has an obligation to safeguard its internal security before
turning to external solutions. In this regard, the United States has
been relatively free from international terrorist attacks. One can
cite a number of reasons: improved airport and customs entry se-
curity, increased funding of the FBI and increased funding of ex-
ternal intelligence gathering means. 36
135. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
136. A summary of United States measures to counter terrorism is contained in
Oakley, supra note 3, and Oakley, International Terrorism: Current Trends and the U.S.
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The United States also has utilized domestic legislation to exert
diplomatic pressure on other states to join in the prevention of in-
ternational terrorism. For example, following the T.W.A. hijacking
in the summer of 1985, pressure was directed at Lebanon to secure
the Beirut airport. The Federal Aviation Act was used to suspend
United States and Lebanese carriers from engaging in air transpor-
tation to and from Lebanon.
1 7
Terrorist activity has spawned improved security for United
States' missions abroad. More security officers are being dispatched
overseas and the missions are being redesigned with security in
mind. 18 The recently passed Act to Combat International Terror-
ism'39 not only authorizes substantial funds to enhance security at
foreign missions, but also provides for payment of rewards for in-
formation concerning terrorist acts.
With these measures implemented, the United States has done
much to improve its domestic security. Yet, the attacks continue
and, if anything, have become more lethal in that the tactic of tak-
ing hostages to negotiate for the securing of demands has been re-
placed by a tactic of indiscriminate violence.'4 0
At the international level, there has been some success in ad-
dressing particular aspects of terrorism. The most noteworthy suc-
cess has been in combatting airline hijacking. The Tokyo Conven-
tion of 1963, the Hague convention of 1970 and the Montreal
Convention of 1971 represent a trilogy of multilateral agreements,
garnering wide state support, designed to deal with violence on and
against civil aircraft. "' The Tokyo Convention was the starting
point and confined itself to clarifying the powers of the aircraft
commander and the issue of jurisdiction over criminal acts commit-
ted on board aircraft."" The Hague Convention dealt with illegal
Response, statement made before the Senate Committees on foreign Relations and on the
Judiciary, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1985, distributed through the Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs [hereinafter International Terrorism: Current Trends and the U.S.
Response].
137. Sofaer, supra note 8, at 40.
138. International Terrorism: Current Trends and the U.S. Response, supra note
136, at 6.
139. Pub. L. 98-533, 98 Stat. 2706 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3071-3077 (Supp.
III 1985)); see President's accompanying statement, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 86.
140. Oakley, supra note 3, at 62.
141. Excellent overviews of these conventions are found in S. WILLIAMS AND J.G. CAS-
TEL, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS 210-22
(1981) and Margo, supra note 127, at 310-14. As of January 1, 1985, 121 states were party
to the Tokyo Convention, 126 states were party to the Hague Convention and 127 states
were party to the Montreal Convention.
142. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
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seizures of aircraft. 4 8 Hijacking was made a crime punishable by
"severe penalties." ' Signatory states were obliged to apprehend
such offenders present in their jurisdiction and then, most impor-
tantly, either prosecute or extradite the offender. 45 To facilitate ex-
tradition, the Convention could be relied on by parties in lieu of a
formal extradition treaty. 46 The Montreal Convention built on the
prior two conventions. Whereas the Hague Convention covered on-
board incidents, the Montreal Convention addressed sabotage and
off-board violence directed at civil aviation. 4" The obligations of
apprehension, prosecution and extradition were included as were
found in the Hague Convention.' 48 Bilateral agreements followed
these multilateral accords. Most prominent were the bilateral
agreements between Cuba and the United States149 and between
Cuba and Canada involving the hijacking of aircraft. 50 These dip-
lomatic efforts, combined with improved airport security, have re-
sulted in a significant decrease in the number of hijacking
incidents. 18
Reflecting similar concerns and hoping to emulate the successes
of the civil aviation conventions, the United Nations sponsored two
international agreements dealing with other aspects of terrorism. In
1973, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.1
52
And in 1979, the General Assembly adopted the International Con-
vention against the Taking of Hostages.'5 " Like the civil aviation
conventions, these agreements contain provision for the signatory
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
143. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1977,
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
144. Id. art. 2.
145. Id. art. 6 and art. 7.
146. Id. art. 8.
147. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Avi-
ation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.1.A.S. No. 7570.
148. Id. art. 6, art. 7 and art. 8.
149. Agreement on the Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses, Feb. 15,
1973, United States--Cuba, 24 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7559.
150. Canada-Cuba Agreement, 1973 Can. T.S. No. 11.
151. In 1969, there were 89 reported hijacking incidents and 88 in 1970. By 1976, the
number was reduced to 22. See Evans, Aircraft and Aviation Facilities, 3, 5 in LEGAL AS-
PECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978).
152. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes, supra note 81. As of
January 1, 1985, 63 states were party to the Convention.
153. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 82. As of
January 6, 1985, 26 states were party to the Convention.
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states either to prosecute or to extradite offenders.1 54
International accords will not be successful in combatting terror-
ism, however, without international cooperation. Here lies the need
for a state to resort to unilateral measures. So-called "safe haven"
states, in defiance of international norms, provide financial, political
and military assistance to terrorist organizations. The United
States named Libya, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua, South Yemen
and North Korea as alleged "safe havens" providing secure sanc-
tuaries of operation for terrorists. 5 The United States' list reflects
ideological bias; nevertheless, Iran and Libya appear to be two
prime antagonists implicated in a number of terrorist actions.156
Libyan culpability is most apparent and goes beyond indirect sup-
port to direct state participation in acts of terrorism. Libyan leader,
Colonel Moammar Khadafy, openly speaks of being in a position to
order terrorist networks to attack "American targets, civilian and
noncivilian, all over the world. 1 57 Further, various radical Palestin-
ian terrorist leaders readily admit to a Libyan connection.158 If we
accept these statements, Libya is acting outside of international
law; unfortunately, there exists no viable international means to
force compliance.
Recourse to the United Nations will not provide any immediate
solution. In reaction to an acknowledged terrorist threat to world
order, the United Nations established the Ad Hoc Committee on
International Terrorism in 1972.159 The committee's mandate was,
and is, broad-too broad. In the 1973 committee meeting, three
main topics were canvassed: a definition of international terrorism,
a study of the underlying causes of terrorism and a determination
of means to prevent terrorism.1 60 The attempt to define terrorism
appears to have been abandoned, or at least it has been deleted as a
154. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes, supra note 80, art. 6
and art. 7; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 81, art. 8
155. Address by President Reagan, supra note 10; International Terrorism: Current
Trends and the U.S. Response, supra note 136, at 5.
156. International Terrorism: Current Trends and the U.S. Response, supra note 136,
at 3.
157. Boston Globe, Apr. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
158. NEWSWEEK. Apr. 7, 1986, at 25. George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, is quoted as referring to Libyan "moral, political and financial
support." Bilal Abu Jihad, military leader of the Palestine Popular Struggle Front, is quoted
as saying: "Of course, Libya is a base for us, and a very important one for the Palestine
cause."
159. G.A. Res. 3034, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972)
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism].
160. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 GAOR Supp.
(No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973).
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topic of debate. The committee has made little progress on the
other issues. It is ideologically deadlocked over the question of pri-
ority. On the one hand, Libya argues: "The best way to combat
terrorism [is] to study its underlying causes and pay adequate at-
tention to practical measures for eliminating them." 161 Syria shares
this view: "It [is] only by studying the underlying causes of terror-
ism and combatting them that it would be possible to combat ter-
rorism itself, for instance by allowing the Palestinian people to ex-
ercise its right to self-determination in an independent state."'162 On
the other hand, Israel refers to the "ad nauseam" debate and states
that the committee has been "sabotaged" by broad, insoluble
causal questions.163 The representative from the United States in a
similar vein complains: "Asserting that nothing should be done
about terrorism until all violence in inter-State relations has been
eliminated [is] simply a smoke-screen to hide an unwillingness to
act."11 6' The Canadian representative, in explaining Canada's deci-
sion to vote against the initial draft resolution creating the commit-
tee some thirteen years earlier, expressed the same opinion:
The relationship between criminal or terrorist acts and the under-
lying causes from which those acts spring is easily recognizable.
Both aspects demand urgent attention and action. However, in
our respective national jurisdictions are there any of our govern-
ments which refrain from taking measures on the one prob-
lem-violence-while other problems are outstanding? We do not
wait for solutions to complex underlying causes of violence and
crime in our own societies before adopting laws and penal systems
to combat individual acts of violence and crime.165
So the committee debates. But time has shown a substantial
change in attitude within the committee towards terrorism.
Originating resolution 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972
targeted for condemnation the "repressive and terrorist acts by co-
lonial, racist and alien regimes." 161 In the most recent resolution,
161. 40 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Comm. (20th mtg.) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/40/SR. 20
(1985).
162. Id. at 18.
163. 40 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Comm. (19th mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/40/SR 19
(1985).
164. Id. at 10.
165. 27 U.N. GAOR (2114th mtg.) at 22 (1972). Canada proposed a draft resolution
providing for an Ad Hoc Committee to study the causes of international terrorism and the
International Law Commission would be requested to draft a convention on measures to
prevent international terrorism.
166. Ad Hoc International Committee on International Terrorism, supra note 159,
4. Subsequent resolutions to renew the committee mandate were 31/102 of 15 December
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condemnation of such regimes has given way to exhortation as in it,
the General Assembly
[flurther urges all states, unilaterally and in co-operation with
other States, as well as relevant United Nations organs, to con-
tribute to the progressive elimination of the causes underlying in-
ternational terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations,
including colonialism, racism and situations involving mass and
flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
and those involving alien occupation, that may give rise to inter-
national terrorism and may endanger international peace and
security. 
1 7
Further, there was no condemnation of terrorist per se in
originating resolution 3034. In contrast, in the 1985 resolution, the
General Assembly
[ulnequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and
practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, in-
cluding those which jeopardize friendly relations among States
and their security.1 '
Resolution 3034 did not address state support for terrorist acts.
In this regard, the 1985 resolution reaffirms the principles of inter-
national law as the General Assembly
[c]alls upon all States to fulfill their obligations under interna-
tional law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or par-
ticipating in terrorist acts in other States, or acquiescing in activi-
ties within their territory directed towards the commission of such
acts. 169
Thus, progress is being made in the sense that there is a growing
recognition that terrorism is unacceptable. Yet, to date, the Ad
Hoc Committee has been unable to reconcile its differences suffi-
ciently to reach a consensus on concrete measures for reducing ter-
rorism. The topic has been deferred to the agenda of the United
Nations Forty-Second Session in 1987.170 In the interim, the victim
states will remain targets.
Where does this leave the victim states? Under Article 2(3) of
the Charter, a state has a duty to settle international disputes by
peaceful means. The duty is not absolute. Self-defense is permissi-
1976, 32/147 of 16 December 1977, 34/145 of 17 December 1979, 36/109 of 10 December
1981, 38/130 of 19 December 1983 and 40/61 of 9 December 1985.
167. G.A. Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR Doc. A/Res/40/61 (1985).
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id. at 15.
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ble when peaceful efforts are not practical. "As a matter of princi-
ple, exhaustion of remedies cannot be required when the 'remedies'
are likely to be futile. '17 1 Unfortunately, the United Nations re-
flects the same divisions that exist in the Ad Hoc Committee. Quite
simply, the United Nations is not prepared to deal with terrorism.
The United Nations mirrors the political realities of the Middle
East, in particular, and of the omnipresent ideological rift between
Western democracies and the Communist world. Until both
sides-Israel and Arab, American and Soviet-have the political
resolve to deal with terrorism, there will be no solution. In this vac-
uum, the only effective remedy of last resort is unilateral action.
VI. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE USE OF FORCE
Proportionality, a traditional hallmark of self-defense, remains
unchanged by Article 51.172 Proportionality is a question of fact. Its
test is reasonableness: State use of force in self-defense must be
reasonable in view of all of the circumstances.1
7 3
McDougal and Feliciano in their book, Law and Minimum
World Public Order, write that proportionality "requires functional
reference to all the various factors relating to the opponent's alleg-
edly aggressive coercion a well as to all the other factors relating to
the claimant's coercion, which together comprise a detailed con-
text. 17 4 In terms of terrorist activities, three reference points are
commonly alluded to: the immediate armed attack, the past cam-
paign of attacks and the potential danger of future attacks. None of
these reference points, standing alone, provides a complete formula
to assess proportionality.
Security Council practice, although far from coherent, appears to
favor a narrow reference to the immediate attack leading to the
state response.' 7 5 Comparison is easy-specific attack to specific re-
sponse. Such an analysis, however, is too simplistic and fails to ade-
quately appreciate the reality of terrorist warfare. A state cannot
be expected to respond on an incident by incident basis. In fact,
such a policy has the inverse effect of encouraging more state incur-
171. Schachter, supra note 66, at 1631.
172. R. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 205.
173. Rohlik, Some Remarks on Self-Defense and Intervention: A Reaction to Reading
Law and Civil War in the Modern World, 6 GA. INT'L & COMP. L. 395, 416 (1976).
174. M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
243 (1961).
175. Bowett, supra note 29, at 7.
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sions, albeit of lesser magnitude.17 6
The preferred practice is to consider all three of the reference
points. The immediate provocation establishes a degree of urgency;
the campaign of past attacks provides an indication of the type of
danger presented; and the danger of future attacks provides a ra-
tionale for protective action.
Protection is the essence of proportionality. McDougal and Feli-
ciano refer to the state response being "limited in intensity and
magnitude to what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the
permissible objectives of self-defense.' 177 Moreover, an action in
self-defense, justifiable at inception, may become tainted by linger-
ing occupation. 17 8 A case in point is the recent United States action
in Grenada which was condemned by an overwhelming majority in
the United Nations General Assembly. 79 The message from the
community of nations is clear: Self-defense ought not be used as a
pretense for state intervention.
Of critical importance is that the force is prudently applied to
avoid civilian casualties. Terrorists deliberately kill civilians; states
must not.180 Certainly, this proposition is in accord with accepted
principles of international law as reiterated in the 1949 Geneva
Convention dealing with non-combatants.'' Terrorism incites
moral outrage because of the indiscriminate killing of innocent peo-
ple. The state acting in response to the "evil" of terrorism must not
commit the same atrocities which it is attempting to prevent. It is
essential that the state preserve this "ethical edge." Otherwise, it
too is guilty of terrorism. The state's obligation goes beyond merely
not directing their weapons at civilian targets. The obligation ex-
tends to reducing collateral harm to civilians when terrorist targets
176. Israel repeatedly has urged, without success, that the Security Council consider
the total context of quasi-belligerence prevailing in the Middle East. This argument is
termed the "accumulation of events" doctrine. The reasons for the Security Council rejecting
this doctrine are not clear. There may well be fear that such a position unduly broadens and
complicates matters or that an emphasis on past acts raises the spectre of reprisal. See gener-
ally, Bowett, supra note 29, at 5-8; and Levenfeld, supra note 2, at 39-41.
177. M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 174, at 242.
178. See Schachter, supra note 66, at 1630-31. Schachter cites as other examples the
Stanleyville "rescue" operation and Dominican Republic intervention.
179. G.A. Res. 38, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/Res. 38
(1983). One hundred eight states voted in favor of the resolution "deploring" the Grenada
action, nine states voted against and there were twenty-seven abstentions.
180. M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 217 (1977).
181. Geneva Convention Relative to the Prosecution of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949-Feb. 12, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(1949). Article 3 applies to non-combatants and prohibits violence directed at the civilian
population and the taking of civilian hostages.
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are attacked. In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer speaks of the prin-
ciple of "double effect"-in pursuit of laudable objectives, foresee-
able "evils" must be minimized. 82 In Walzer's analysis, one pre-
requisite for "double effect" is that "[t]he intention of the actor is
good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; the evil
effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends, and,
aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting costs
to himself."18 Walzer's principle finds authority in Webster's fa-
mous formulation in the Caroline case. Webster demanded of the
British government the following:
It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons
on board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been un-
availing; it must be shown that daylight could not be waited for;
that there could be no attempt at discrimination between the in-
nocent and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to seize
and detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and
inevitable, for attacking her in darkness of the night, while
moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep on
board, killing some and wounding others, and then drawing her
into the current, above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, care-
less to know whether there might not be in her the innocent with
the guilty, or the living with the dead, committing her to a fate
which fills the imagination with horror.
184
What is looked for is a "positive commitment to save civilian
lives."' 185 Reliable intelligence is needed to accurately target terror-
ist sites and the force, when used, must be confined as much as
possible to these targets. For example, high altitude aerial bombing
ought to give way to a more surgical and precise strike. Considera-
tion is taken of the military sophistication at the disposal of the
responding state. Presumably, the greater the degree of sophistica-
tion, the wider the range of military options enabling avoidance of
civilian harm. There will be instances where proximity of terrorist
targets to civilian population makes a military response unaccept-
able. It is no answer for the responding state to pass blame on to
the terrorists for purposely hiding among the civilian population.186
In such situations, military actions, if they cannot pinpoint the ter-
182. M. WALZER, supra note 180, at 155.
183. Id. For an application of Walzer's theory to Israel's invasion of South Lebanon,
see Levenfeld, supra note 2, at 41-45.
184. Jennings, supra note 42, at 89 (emphasis added).
185. M. WALZER, supra note 180, at 156.
186. Levenfeld, supra note 2, at 45.
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rorist targets, should not be undertaken.
Nor is it acceptable, in the alternative, to use military force di-
rected at non-terrorist targets in the harboring state. These actions
take on the form of reprisals; the intention is to coerce the harbor-
ing state and the action is removed from being purely defensive.
Such responses are violations of Article 2(4) of the Charter in that
force is directed "against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence" of the harboring state and is not a legitimate act of self-
defense.
Thus, the guiding determination in assessing the proportionality
of a state response is confinement. The state response should be
confined to a protective action; the military force relied on should
be confined to the achievement of this objective; and the force
should be confined to terrorist targets with active measures taken to
avoid civilian casualties. To be sure, the above criteria pose rigid
qualifications, but they do not amount to a policy of "paralysis" as
is suggested by Secretary of State Shultz. 187 Rather, such caution
in the deployment of force shows respect for international law and
respect for the loss of civilian lives.
VII. SUMMARY AND GUIDELINES
Richard Falk is of the opinion that the primary role for interna-
tional law, and international law scholarship, is to assist decision
makers and to help governments plan "how to act."18 For Falk,
international rules, as represented in the Charter of the United Na-
tions, are too rigid to provide "realistic" guidance for states in ad-
dressing indirect subversion. 89 Accordingly, Falk looks outside of
the United Nations' norms in developing a framework for the "Law
of Retaliation."190 In a complementary work, Bowett builds on
Falk's framework to formulate "Criteria for Reasonableness of Re-
prisals," once again, outside conventional United Nations law."9
187. Secretary of State Shultz as quoted in the Boston Globe, Jan. 21, 1986, at 18,
col. 1. Secretary of State Shultz is a vocal advocate for a military option. In an earlier
speech, he cautioned: "But we cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, wor-
rying endlessly over whether and how to respond." Schultz, supra note 9, at 16. In contrast,
Secretary of Defense Weinberger is wary of resorting to military force. See Arnold, Rewrit-
ing the Rules of Engagement, 175, 180 in FIGHTING BACK (N. Livingston & T. Arnold eds.
1986).
188. Falk, supra note 2, at 442.
189. Id. at 438.
190. Id. at 415.
191. Bowett, supra note 29, at 25-27.
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The guidelines proposed in this Article are designed both to aid
in the decision making function and to provide a legal framework,
within the United Nations' norms, to assess the "Law of State Re-
sponse." As a general conclusion, state use of force in response to
international terrorism is permissable under the doctrine of self-de-
fense. There is no need to opt out of the United Nations' order.
This conclusion is premised on the narrowest parameter of self-de-
fense: the requirement of an "armed attack" under Article 51.
Once terrorist activities reach systematic proportions to constitute
an "armed attack," a state may respond with force provided that
the dictates of necessity and proportionality are met. The burden of
persuasion rests with the state to bring its action under self-
defense. 192
The following principles are proposed to guide in the decision to
use force in response to international terrorist acts and to guide in
the subsequent review of this decision:
1) The avowed intention advanced to justify resort to military force
is self-defense.
2) There exists a concerted campaign of terrorist attacks against
the state or its nationals abroad and the terrorist organization re-
sponsible is identified.
3) The harboring state, in whose territory military force is used
against the terrorist organization, supported, encouraged or know-
ingly tolerated the terrorist organization and its terrorist activities.
4) All responsible means of peaceful redress are exhausted.
5) The responsive force is directed at terrorist targets.
6) The force used is proportional to the terrorist provocation and
measures are taken to minimize collateral harm to innocent
civilians.193
"Active defense," therefore, is not inherently illegal. Interna-
tional law is flexible enough to accommodate such an application of
force. The danger created by terrorist acts is recognized and, in the
absence of effective international cooperation, a state may look to
its own devises for protection. However, "active defense" must be a
policy of last resort demanding reasoned restraint. It is a policy
fraught with the potential for abuse and the world community will
192. Brownlie, supra note 51, at 195.
193. For a comparison of other guidelines, see Falk, supra note 2, at 441-42; Bowett,
supra note 29, at 25-27; Taulbee, Retaliation and Irregular Warfare in Contemporary Inter-
national Law, 7 INT'L L. 195, 203 (1973); Toensing, The Legal Case for using force. 145,
154 in FIGHTING BACK (N. Livingston & T. Arnold eds. 1986); and Arnold, supra note 180,
at 180 (quoting guidelines suggested by Defense Secretary Weinberger).
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be ever scrupulous in assessing the decision to employ a military
option. The state responding must be equally scrupulous in its deci-
sion to employ a military option.
42
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 17, o. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol17/iss1/2
